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CHANDLER v. COMMONWEALTH
455 S.E.2d 219 (Va. 1995)
Virginia Supreme Court
FACTS
Lance Antonio Chandler was tried in the Circuit
Court of Halifax County on charges of capital mur-
der, use of a firearm in commission of a murder, rob-
bery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and use of a fire-
arm in the commission of a robbery. In selecting a
jury, the state and the defendant were each given five
peremptory strikes. From a venire of sixteen whites
and eight blacks, the defendant struck five whites,
and the state struck three blacks and two whites. At
the close of this proceeding, the defendant made a
motion under Batson v. Kentucky,I claiming the pros-
ecution used its peremptory strikes disproportion-
ately. The prosecution gave various race-neutral rea-
sons for striking the blacks challenged. The trial judge
overruled Chandler's motion.
After trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on
all charges. Based on the "future dangerousness" predi-
cate,2 the jury at penalty stage of the bifurcated trial
recommended death as punishment for the capital mur-
der. The judge imposed the sentence recommended by
the jury.
Chandler was entitled to automatic review of the
capital murder conviction by the Virginia Supreme
Court.3 On appeal, Chandler claimed inter alia that the
trial court had erred in denying Chandler's Batson mo-
tion to disallow the prosecution's striking of three black
potential jurors. He claimed that the number of black
venire persons struck had been disproportionate to the
number of blacks represented on the venire. Chandler
claimed that the reasons given by the prosecution for its
use of the peremptory strikes were insufficient to meet
the burden imposed by Batson.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court found no reversible
error among the several issues raised by Chandler and
refused to commute the sentence of death.4 With re-
gard to the Batson issue, the Virginia Supreme Court
gave the trial court "substantial deference" 5 The trial
'476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 19-264.2 (Michie 1995).
3Id., §§ 17-110.1(A), (F).
4 Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219, 228 (Va.
1995).
5 Id. at 224.
6Id.
7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). But see Pow-
court had determined that the Commonwealth's use of
its peremptory strikes was not racially motivated and
therefore not unconstitutional. This determination was
not "clearly erroneous" 6 and therefore not reversible on
appeal. Going a step beyond previous holdings, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's review included an examination
of the record to determine the validity of the
prosecution's race-neutral reasons.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
Batson established a three-prong test for courts
to apply in evaluating claims of racial discrimination
in the use of peremptory challenges. The first prong
of the test places the initial burden on the defendant
to establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that
the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial
group; (2) that the prosecutor used preemptory chal-
lenges to remove venire persons of the defendant's
race; and (3) that the relevant evidence raised an in-
ference of racial discrimination by the prosecutor.
7
Once the prima facie case is shown, the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to present race-neutral reasons re-
lated to the case being tried.8 After the prosecution
has provided race-neutral reasons for its use of the
peremptory strikes, the defendant may challenge
those reasons as pretextual. 9 Ultimately, the trial court
must determine if the defendant has established pur-
poseful discrimination."
I. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
It is not difficult for a defendant to establish a prima
facie case of racial discrimination in the prosecution's
use of its peremptory challenges. Courts require a de-
fendant to make a relatively low showing of proof to
establish theprimafacie case. Chandler was able to meet
this initial burden simply by pointing out that the pros-
ecution used its peremptory strikes disproportionately
to the number of blacks on the venire. Generally, the
disproportionate use of peremptory strikes is enough to
establish a primafacie case for Batson purposes."
ers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,409-10 (1991) (holding that all crimi-
nal defendants, regardless of race, can object to racially-moti-
vated use of peremptory strikes.).
'Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
9Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414,415 (Va. 1994).
10 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
' See Buck, 443 S.E.2d at 415 (accepting use of three pe-
remptory strikes to strike two African-Americans as prima fa-
The reviewing court will assume that the prima fa-
cie case has been established once the inquiry progresses
beyond the defendant's initial showing.'2 If the prosecu-
tion addresses the challenge with explanations and the
trial court makes a final determination on the issue, the
reviewing court will consider the establishment of a
prima fade case to be moot.'3Thus Chandler could ap-
peal the Batson issue without having to make a prima
fade case anew to the Virginia Supreme Court, even
though the trial court in Chandler never actually ruled
on whether Chandler had made the required prima fa-
cie showing. Because the prosecution responded to
Chandler's assertions with explanations of its peremp-
tory strikes and the trial court held that there was no
purposeful discrimination, Chandler could appeal the
trial court's ruling as though the trial court had in fact
ruled that a prima facie case had been established.
II. THE STATE'S BURDEN
Once the defendant establishes the primafacie case,
the challenged party has the burden of providing race-
neutral explanations for the questioned strikes.' 4 A race-
neutral explanation in the context of this analysis "means
an explanation based on something other than the race
of the juror."' 6 The discriminatory purpose must be in-
herent on the face of the explanation in order for the
court to find a constitutional violation.' 6
The state can meet its burden with relative ease. 7
Prosecutors can successfully assert irrelevant and inac-
curate explanations for striking venire persons.'8 Pros-
ecutors can strike potential jurors because of their ap-
cie evidence of racial discrimination); Moore v. Keller Indus.,
948 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1991) (accepting as prima fade evi-
dence of racial discrimination use of three peremptory chal-
lenges to strike two African-Americans).
2 James v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va.
1994).
13 Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991).
S4 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
"Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866.
1d.
"See Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge is
No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to Eradi-
cate Invidious Discrimination form. Jury Selection, 43 DEPAuL L.
REv. 625, 634 (1994) (suggesting that prosecutors may ex-
clude potential jurors based on race so long as they can articu-
late race-neutral reason).
" See Ruth E. Friedman and Bryan A. Stevenson, Deliber-
ate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal
Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 509,522-24 (1994) (illustrat-
ing that courts accept inaccurate and irrelevant race-neutral
reasons).
'9 See Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414, 415 (Va.
1994) (concluding that striking potential juror because of"col-
lege athletic jacket" was race-neutral and 'legitimate reason[ ]
of trial tactics").
pearance, 19 living address,20 employment,2" family, 2 age,23
demeanor,24 or merely the prosecution's intuitive as-
sumptions.
2
In Chandler, the prosecution's explanations for the
striking of three black potential jurors fell within the
usual realm of race-neutral reasoning. The prosecution
struck two of the potential jurors because of their stance
on the death penalty.26 One struck black juror stated
that she did not believe in the death penalty. The sec-
ond struck black juror indicated that it might be diffi-
cult for him to impose the death penalty. The prosecu-
tion said it sought to remove a third black juror because
he was, in the prosecution's opinion, "remarkably
noncommunicative."27
III. THE COURT'S DETERMINATION
After the prosecution has offered its explanations,
the trial court must determine whether the defendant
has established purposeful discrimination?8 Generally,
this requires examining the explanations to determine
whether they are facially discriminatory.29 The defen-
dant can challenge the prosecution's reasons as merely
pretextual ° Intent or purposeful discrimination is re-
quired to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
under Batson?
In Chandler, the defendant failed to make any
pretextual arguments to the trial court. Chandler only
argued that the prosecution's use of the peremptory
strikes was disproportionate.3 2 The trial court therefore
had no obligation to assess the genuineness of the




21 See James v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va.
1994) (upholding prosecution's use of peremptory strike to
remove nursing assistant as race-neutral because such employ-
ment "reinforced the perception" of sympathy).
22 Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219, 224 (Va.
1995) (citing James, 442 S.E.2d at 398); See Buck, 443 S.E.2d
at 415 (conduding that striking of potential juror because she
"did not have children, while most of the other potential ju-
rors did" was legitimate and race-neutral).
"3Moorev. KellerIndus., 948 F.2d 199,202 (5th Cir. 1991);
Buck, 443 S.E.2d at 415.
24Moore, 948 F.2d at 202; Chandler, 455 S.E.2d at 224.
s See Moore, 948 S.E.2d at 202 (allowing trial counsel "to
rely upon initiative assumptions).26 Chandler, 455 S.E.2d at 223.
27 See id. (noting that juror's responses included, "1No,""Yes
sir,""No, I don't," and "I'm comfortable with the prosecution.")
28 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,98 (1986).
29Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991).
'-Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414,415 (Va. 1994)
(citing United States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 99, 103 (4th Cir. 1991).
31 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866.
32 Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219, 224 (Va.
1995).
33 See Broady v. Commonwealth, 429 S.E.2d 468, 470-71
(Va. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that trial court must examine
ply found that the explanations were race-neutral and
overruled the motion of the defendant.
IV. THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
The reviewing court will accord great deference to
the trial court's finding of no purposeful discrimination.34
In determining discriminatory intent the "best evidence
will often be the demeanor of the attorney who exer-
cises the challenge,13 and it is the trial judge who is in
the best position to evaluate the state of mind of the
prosecutor.36 Therefore the reviewing court will reverse
the trial court's findings only if they are dearly errone-
ous.
37
In Buck v. Commonwealth,38 the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered whether the trial court's findings
could be reversed based upon pretext arguments made
by the defendant on appeal.39 The defendant in that case
had failed to explain to the trial court his reason for
believing that the prosecutions asserted explanations
were pretextual. 40 The Buck court held that when the
defendant fails to raise pretextual arguments at trial, she
is precluded from advancing them on appeal .4 Because
the defendant had conceded that the prosecution's ex-
planations were race-neutral, the Buck court was left with
nothing to consider on the Batson issue. Even if the de-
fendant had not conceded that issue, the reviewing
court's duty still would not have involved an examina-
tion of the prosecution's motives.
After the prosecution offered its race-neutral expla-
nations for its use of the peremptory strikes, Chandler
failed to make any assertions that the reasons were
pretextual. Chandler also failed to raise a pretextual ar-
gument on appeal, arguing only that the prosecution
should be required to give a more developed explana-
tion.42 Under these circumstances, Buck precludes the
reviewing court from examining the prosecution's prof-
fered reasons and limits the court's review to the race-
neutrality of the explanations.43
motives of prosecutor after defendant has pointed out unequal
treatment of similarly situated blacks and whites).
-Moore v. Keller Indus, 948 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1991).
35Hernandezv. NewYork, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991).
36Id.
37Chandler 455 S.E.2d at 223.
38443 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1994).
'9Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414,415 (Va. 1994).
401d. at 416.
411d.
In Chandler, however, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia did examine the prosecution's stated race-neutral
explanations for evidence of pretext. 44 Considering
Chandler's only contention, that the prosecution was
required to offer more than a race-neutral reason, the
court was not required to consider anything more than
the facial validity of the prosecution's explanations. In-
stead, the court examined the explanations underlying
bases. The court looked to see if the reasons given by
the prosecution were supported by the record.41 With
regard to prospective juror Williams, the court exam-
ined all of his answers to the defenses attorney's ques-
tions and found them to support the state's contention
that he was "remarkably noncommunicative."46 The Buck
court would not have gone that far.
CONCLUSION
In Chandler the Virginia Supreme Court examined
the record of the voir dire in order to ascertain whether
the defendant had proven purposeful discrimination. In
doing so, the court may have opened a small opportu-
nity through which attorneys who fail to maintain pre-
text arguments at trial may still have the arguments heard
on appeal. It is still the duty of the party asserting pur-
poseful discrimination to alert the court to reasons why
the given explanations are pretextual. However, it is not
dear that the pretext argument will be lost if it is not
asserted at trial. Until it becomes clearer whether the
strict procedural requirements of Buck are loosening,
raising the pretextual issues at trial is the only way to
ensure that they will be considered on appeal. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's willingness to examine the pre-
text issue is consistent with the constitutional require-
ment of heightened due process in capital cases.
47
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Dennis Crovella
42Appellant's Brief at p.21-22, Chandlerv. Commonwealth;
455 S.E.2d. 219 (Va. 1995) (No. 940975).
43Buck, 443 S.E.2d at 416.
44Chandlery. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219,223-24 (Va.
1995).
4 1d. at 223.
461d. at 224.
47 See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(discussing the constitutional requirement of heightened due
process in capital cases).
